

Educating the Feminine Voice in Philosophy

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INTRODUCTION: EDUCATING PHILOSOPHY, RELEASING THE FEMALE VOICE

In June 2015, there was a conference in Helsinki entitled, “Women in the History of Philosophy.” Feminist scholars from Northern Europe got together and were engaged in discussing the voice of women in philosophy.¹ The majority of the participants were women, and there was a tacit assumption that the topic should be about female philosophers. I presented a paper on Stanley Cavell, a male, white, American philosopher, and this caused something of a stir. What the female voice in philosophy amounts to is the actual voices of women! But, I wonder, is that all? There was an air of resistance and opposition to what I said, if not of exclusion. This surprising experience—but, I wonder again now, should I have been surprised?—confronted me with fundamental questions. *What can be meant by the female voice in philosophy? What would it be its appropriate adjective—the woman’s voice, female voice, or feminine voice? Who, if anyone, owns this?* Of course, these are not new questions. Carol Gilligan speaks of the female voice as a “different voice,” while Nel Noddings talks of a “feminine approach”; and Judith Butler addresses “gender trouble,” on the principle that gender is socially and culturally constructed.² They criticize the dominance of masculine, *logos*-oriented approaches in academia. Yet despite the sometimes ground-breaking contributions of these representative female philosophers, the female voice in philosophy remains constrained within conventional masculine discourse. When it is presented in academic conferences and journals,

its potentially rich implications are somehow muffled in a fundamentally unchanged style of philosophical argument—typically oppositional and argumentative. Despite the call for gender equality, philosophy remains male-centered, with women somewhat peripheral to the enterprise—and this, not only in terms of its physical and visible aspects but also in the way philosophy is done. When it comes to the question of *how* the female voice is perceived, expressed, and represented, there still remains an imbalance. The questions of what “the female voice” might mean and who it is that represents this still remain open.

Beginning with these preliminary questions, this article not only considers what the woman’s voice amounts to; it also explores how it might be released in common discourse in academia and how we (both men and women) can *learn to* attend to such a “different voice.” There are questions here of the kind of education in philosophy through which men and women might be mutually transformed. In response, this article proposes to re-place the subject of philosophy, and the subject of woman, through an alternative idea of *the feminine voice in philosophy*. It tries to reconfigure the female voice without negating its fated biological origin and traits, and yet avoiding the confining of thought to the constraints of gender divides. This is to represent the *feminine* in terms of an archetype, as an aspect of the very nature of language. It is to find in the notion of voice a key to the education of philosophy for the co-existence of men and women.

In the second section, I shall start to explore a conception of the feminine voice that retains the biological difference and yet does not assimilate it into gender distinction. I shall introduce Paul Standish’s idea of the “feminine-receptive mode” of language and thought in his attempt to *re-place the subject of philosophy*, a “different voice” uttered and enacted by a male philosopher. In the third section, I shall examine the

feminine voice of another male philosopher, Stanley Cavell's attention to and echoing of the woman's voice in his autobiography and in his writings on film. I shall represent this as *the feminism of the father tongue*, an archetypal voice that crosses gender divides. The central theme there is the theft of the female voice by a male and how the woman, in contesting tears, comes to reclaim her voice of affirmation. In the final section, as an educational implication, I shall propose the conversation of justice as a way of cultivating the feminine voice in philosophy. This is an occasion of mutual destabilization and transformation of man and woman, crossing gender divides, and prepares an alternative route to political criticism to rectify the imbalance and to reclaim the rights of women.

RECLAIMING THE FEMININE VOICE IN PHILOSOPHY, RE-PLACING PHILOSOPHY

After the aforementioned conference, I received the following comments from the organizer of the conference:

Your use of the term "gender" is unclear. You seem to use it to describe an essentialistic idea of the feminine or masculine or stereotypes about the sexes that get us stuck in rules about how females or males should be. ... Gender is meant to mean the socially constructed attributes of feminine, masculine, non-binary, etc.³

As this comment illustrates, there are some patterns in the way the female voice is treated and discussed in academia. There exists a confrontational relationship between the essentialist approach and socio-cultural approach in the definition of woman. Oftentimes, the female voice is featured by its particularity (care), and, in response to this, the concern

has been raised that this may block the way to universal justice.⁴ The female voice tends to be associated with the weak and disadvantaged in the context of ideological and political debate.⁵ Furthermore when the female voice is discussed, it is oftentimes done from the third person perspective—speakers talking *about* women, and oftentimes, in the assertive, masculine mode. These modes of thinking and speaking continue to reinforce the divide between men and women, while the female voice is exposed to the danger of being assimilated into the existing mode of doing philosophy. The originally rich nature of female voice, its distinctive voice of the “I,” becomes dissipated. Consequently the masculine discourse is re-circulated involving both men and women. The subject of philosophy remains the same; the positions of those who talk about the female voice are hardly ever destabilized. How can the female voice be rescued from this vicious cycle of reappropriation in academic discourse?

In response, Standish shows the *feminine* voice in philosophy to be of importance not as the property of female philosophers (understood biologically or in terms of an ideological boundary) but rather within the broader terms of what he refers to as re-placing the subject of philosophy.⁶ To replace can mean “to substitute” but it can also mean “to place again” or “to place differently.” He intends also that “subject” here refers both to philosophy as an academic subject and to the human subject, with its etymological implications that “sub-ject” means “under (sub)” and “-ject (thrown).” In his *Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits of Language*,⁷ Standish presents a re-placed subject of philosophy, realized in relation to a provocative idea of the *feminine mode of language and thought*, which to some has seemed scandalous. He contrasts the “receptive-responsiveness” of the feminine voice with the “rational-assertiveness” of the masculine.⁸ In contrast to the latter’s judgmental or assertive mode, the former is presented in relation to

the other-regarding virtues of *receptivity* and *humility*, effecting a shift of thinking from the excessive prominence of the idea of rational autonomy in modern Western philosophy. This thematization of the masculine and feminine draws on archetypes of ancient lineage, in which biological and cultural elements come together. Such replacing of the subject necessitates our receptiveness and sensitivity towards what is transitory and obscure, and to the limits of what we can grasp or know. The point is to turn the attention to alternative dimensions of experience and reality. Standish associates the idea of the feminine voice with the related ideas of suffering, passion, and patience. This emphatically does not, however, attribute emotion as irrational to women: rather he considers these emotional aspects of human beings to be a part of human reason, what constitutes the subject of philosophy. In discussing John Llewelyn's writing on Levinas, Standish relates this alternative way of philosophy to the grammatical middle voice—a voice that is somewhere between the active and the passive.⁹ He turns towards a more transitory provisional possibility of language, which goes beyond the oppositions between man and woman, and reason and emotion.

In the exploitation of these archetypes, Standish risks being accused of being “sexist.” In fact he takes the view that before the struggle for women's rights, there exists a philosophical question: “What is the significance of the woman's voice?” Here, the feminine does not exactly represent biological women. While it is true that the feminine voice is *a different* voice, this does not mean either that this voice is common to all women or that the plurality of the actual voices of women is to be eulogized. The alternative, feminine scope opens a different way of thinking, a way that has been suppressed where the (masculine) oppositional representation of the female has held sway. This is redolent of the “monolingualism” of masculine discourse.¹⁰ The idea of the feminine presented by Standish suggests the resilient self of woman, one that is

different enough to be able to break the chain of reappropriation that the female voice has undergone.

FEMINISM OF THE FATHER TONGUE

I propose here to talk about philosophy in connection with something I call the voice, by which I mean to talk at once about the tone of philosophy and about my right to take that tone.¹¹

Cavell's ordinary language philosophy provides us further with a way to "replace philosophy"¹² by elaborating the idea of the feminine voice in philosophy. Cavell is a philosopher of voice who affirms "the education of humans, of making language mine, of finding my voice."¹³ His life-long endeavor within philosophy is to restore a form of "autobiographical expression," reclaiming the first-person perspective in philosophy.¹⁴ Institutionalized philosophy, he claims, with its fated arrogance, has brought about a denial of the other—a disparagement of the common and the ordinary, and hence of that distinctively American voice found in Emerson and Thoreau. Practicing philosophy in the ordinary, Cavell says, requires an ear to hear the tone of a particular voice—the "Emersonian and the *feminine* demands for a language of one's own."¹⁵ Emerson says that "women, as most susceptible, are the best index of the coming hour" and that the feminine voice is delicate, even feeble, and yet in a certain sense, resilient.¹⁶ Cavell's reclaiming of the feminine voice in philosophy, especially because he is a male philosopher, invites the criticism from some feminist philosophers. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey argues that Cavell's idea of the male and the female reinstates an oppressive binary of the sexes, to the detriment of the feminine.¹⁷ Cavell's view, however, cannot be reduced to a matter of gender difference or a matter of incorporating more voices of women in philosophy. He chal-

lenges the monolithic masculine voice, and yet his strategy is oblique.

In Cavell's autobiographical writings, the controversial biological difference is presented most straightforwardly in the figure of the father and the mother. Cavell's idea of the feminine is not exclusively related to the mother, but in some way *both* to his father and to his mother. His life in philosophy then has been "directed to discovering the child's voice"—his own voice, which had been "denied" in the tension between his father and his mother.¹⁸ On the one hand, his mother, a pianist, had "perfect pitch,"¹⁹ but she had a tendency to keep her feelings in their "secret places."²⁰ On the other hand, his father had "a knack for telling stories," a "tact or pitch" of story-telling, and it was from his father that he came to understand something of what he was later to call the "philosophy of the concepts of pawnbroking."²¹ Cavell incorporated into himself his father's "shame of himself," his "self-contempt for his failures" in the world.²² Cavell's father and mother admired each other's talent, but they were in "despair of harmony," manifested in his mother's "periodic silences."²³ The figure of the "mad child," which pervades Cavell's writings, and the figure of a silenced child in "complete isolation, and absence of voice" represent the state of a human being devoid of intelligibility to the world.²⁴ Cavell describes his childhood wish for "erasing and transfiguring" his identity.²⁵ Through his parents' argument, Cavell acquired his "conception of philosophy as the achievement of the unpolemical, of the refusal to take sides in metaphysical positions."²⁶ For him, finding voice is a matter of "translat[ing]" his father's and mother's words, especially in lending his ear to his mother's silent melancholy.²⁷

With this quasi-psychoanalytical root in Cavell's philosophy, the feminine voice is explored in the genre of what he calls the "melodrama of the unknown woman."²⁸ The central theme is the "incorporation,

or theft, of the feminine” voice in the name of “love as possession.”²⁹ Cavell calls this “mutual victimization, sapping of one another, vampirism,” relating this to “what Emerson spots as adultery.”³⁰ This is men’s “plagiarizing women’s thoughts” as “a distrust of their own originality.”³¹ And this resounds with the Emersonian idea of conformity, in which human beings “have no voice.”³² Philosophically speaking, this dark side of the feminine voice is inseparable from the threat of skepticism.³³ We suffer from the “perpetual incompleteness of human expression” and from a “horror of understanding.”³⁴ “Denial” of the other and “interest in the world withdrawn to the point of chronic boredom, lost in lovelessness” are the fated human condition.³⁵

Here the “father tongue,” which Cavell quotes from Thoreau, has paradoxically a crucial relevance to the nature of the *feminine* voice of philosophy. By contrast to the mother tongue (“commonly transitory, a sound, a tongue, a dialect merely, almost brutish”), the father tongue is “a reserved and select expression, too significant to be heard by the ear, which we must be born again in order to speak.”³⁶ Though the idea here is controversial as it seems to disparage the mother, the father here is not an authority figure. Rather, together, they symbolize our dual relation to language. Thinking of the woman’s voice in opera, Cavell speaks of “the breath of life,” associating it with the body: this he calls the “dimension of orality, the depth of talking.”³⁷ There is something bodily, sensual in Cavell’s view of language. Here the idea of the father connotes separation, split, discontinuity and mediacy—all of which hinges on *re*birth as symbolizing a process of reengagement.³⁸ This is not, however, a once-and-for-all event, but a daily baptism, a daily requirement that our right relation to language exacts. The rebirth of language involves a “discontinuous reconstitution of what has been said, a recounting of the past, autobiographizing, deriving words from yourself.”³⁹

Let me bring out the paradox here by saying that Cavell's attempt to re-place philosophy might better be expressed with the phrase *the feminism of the father tongue*—a philosophy that is feminine without being feminized. The feminism of the father tongue releases us from the illusion of relation that is typically associated with the feminine and motherhood—which is oftentimes affiliated with interdependence, home and belonging—and from the idea of language as conventionally represented by the mother tongue. It is related to emotion, passion, and receptivity, and yet is not a reactionary turn to irrationalism. In *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell claims that passion and desire are the sources of our “search for reason.”⁴⁰ This is echoed in and echoes Emersonian thinking as “the passive (patience, passion),” thinking as reception, and “thinking as the receiving or letting be of something.”⁴¹ This is not to compromise reason, but rather to make it more rigorous.

The feminism of the father tongue provocatively transgresses the gender distinction, bringing us (men and women) back to the state of the “infantile, before the establishment of human gender, that is, before the choices of identification and objectification of masculine and feminine have settled themselves”—the state that Emerson calls “neutrality”—before the ideological, political debate begins.⁴² “Neutrality” here is different from the category of the neuter: it requires a process of achievement, by “the self as on a path,” as a condition of finding one's voice.⁴³ In relation to this we all stand as “infants,” literally as those who cannot speak. From this perspective, the feminine voice in philosophy can best be thought of as an *archetype*. This is a dimension of the human that is there in some degree in women and men in the state of infancy, later to be socially and culturally determined. These archetypes are figured in aspects of the biological body, well before they are taken into ideological partisanship (that is, into stances of opposition or conflict). Echoing Emerson's idea that the “inmost in due time becomes the

outmost,” the feminism of the father tongue acquires its objectivity and publicity in the process of becoming, working through the particular and singular to express what is universal and representative, and thus to “stand for humanity.”⁴⁴

CONTESTING TEARS, CROSSING GENDER DIVIDES

The position of women is neither that of exiles nor of immigrants: unlike the immigrant, the woman’s problem is not one of not belonging but one of belonging, only on the wrong terms; unlike the exile, the woman is not between two different cultures but is at odds with the one in which she was born and is roughly in the process of transfiguring into one that does not exist, one as it were still in confinement.⁴⁵

At the conference mentioned at the beginning of this article, my presentation of Cavell’s interpretation of the melodrama of the unknown woman—his reading of *Stella Dallas* not, as typically understood, as a story of self-sacrifice (of a mother for her daughter), but as one of “self-liberation and self-empowering, epitomized precisely as the claiming of a face,” substantiated by his emphasis on Stella’s leaving home and separation from her daughter, her walking towards the screen with a smile mixed with her tears—invited strong criticism.⁴⁶ What I said sounded to my critics to be too cold, uncaring, harsh, even inhumane. It was scandalous as it disturbed, so it seemed, the current of academic feminist discourse.

By contrast, the point of the feminism of the father tongue is not to negate the significance of care but to reinforce it, so that care is redirected towards the regaining of the singularity of the female voice

to break the chain of reappropriation. In the melodrama of the unknown woman, the woman eventually regains her voice, as exemplified in *Gaslight* by the voice of Paula: “Now I exist. Now I speak for myself; and in particular because I speak in hatred and to you, who have always pretended to understand me, and pretended not to understand me, and who I now know will alone understand my every word and gesture.”⁴⁷ The finding of a female voice is the matter of her “right to words, of her own voice.”⁴⁸ The woman now learns to speak in the father tongue, undergoing a “process of mourning” to morning—a therapeutic procedure of being born again, from “the binaries of parental words,” to regain “my right to exist, to have a birth.”⁴⁹

The feminine voice of the father tongue is different from the voice asserting human rights, in outrage at social injustice; rather in patience and silence, a woman in the film cultivates the ground for activating her voice in the “pain of individuation” by taking new steps.⁵⁰ Echoing Emerson’s voice—“I grieve that grief can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real nature”—Cavell says, “Despair is not bottomless, merely endless; a hopelessness, or fear, of reaching bottom.”⁵¹ The emphasis here is on *contesting tears* as the “teaching of tears.”⁵² This is the evocation of what Emerson calls “the sacred affirmative,”⁵³ “to move beyond nihilism.”⁵⁴ Emersonian perfectionism is the morality of self-empowerment and liberation, not that of self-sacrifice, self-abrogation, or self-forgetting, the latter oftentimes being attributed to women as the weak. The “feminine” tone of the “I think” is *prophetic* and “extra-vagant.”⁵⁵ Saying “I think” creates the very moment when the heightened tone of “my” voice marks this particular time in history—the moment of the rebirth of the feminine.

The “unknown woman” suffers from an “uncanny homeliness.”⁵⁶ Her feminine voice teaches us to learn to relinquish our belong-

ing for the sake of finding a better way—which is a matter, to follow Wittgenstein, of accepting the sense of our being “endlessly homeless.”⁵⁷ Cavell’s suggestion might be for an ethic of un-belonging, the teaching of “learning to walk away.”⁵⁸ Far from what is imagined in philosophy as the secure rationality of the autonomous self, the subject of the woman, with which this is to be re-placed, is more vulnerable, insecure, and yet resilient. Leaving the home ground of philosophy, the feminism of the father tongue offers a way of thinking that is missing from the familiar political discourse of marginalization, suppression, and subordination. In contrast to the politics of recognition and to the “politics of resistance,”⁵⁹ we might call this the *politics of acknowledgment*—acknowledging of what is beyond one’s grasp and surprise at the scary and disturbing. This strange, uncomfortable position of the feminine will affect men, but only if those men are perceptive enough, ready to be affected, disturbed, and changed themselves. And this requires education.

Cavell calls for “serious conversation between women and men.”⁶⁰ This is the “happy possibility” of friendship and mutual education between man and woman.⁶¹ For a woman to “regain [her] tongue,” the other as a friend is a crucial resource in finding the measure of the authority of her speech.⁶² The friend awakens us—making us “ashamed of our shame,” of the state of our conformity—and represents “our beyond,” through “recognition and negation.”⁶³ This is an occasion for mutual destabilizing, for the undergoing, for both man and woman, of the “shock of recognition.”⁶⁴ By contrast to Rawls’ theory of justice and his idea of “cooperation,” Cavell presents the idea of the “conversation of justice.”⁶⁵ Such conversation is to retain space for “the opacity, or non-transparency, of the present state of our interactions, cooperative or antagonistic.”⁶⁶ Its virtues are “those of listening, the responsiveness to difference, the willingness for change.”⁶⁷ The conversation of justice will undo the knots in our thinking that arise from the oppositional and

argumentative mode of doing philosophy. Crossing gender divides, the archetypal feminine voice is to be cultivated in such conversation.

Philosophy awaits education as *transformation*, the therapy of its subject. Philosophy thus reconceived can open its possibilities for the education of men and women as the subject of humanities. We can begin this in our common practice in secondary and higher education. Film, for example, can be incorporated into the curriculum of philosophy and social science. In the cultivation of the aesthetic imagination, it will heighten our sensibility to the invisible but deep-seated phenomenon of the theft of the woman's voice in academia. There, resisting easy oppositions and categorization and crossing gender divides, the feminism of the father tongue will guide us to a more oblique, and yet a more radical way of political criticism. Contesting tears, it can teach men and women to reclaim their right to speak, to find their own first-person voice, and hence to provide a way for political education to rectify an "imbalance" between men and women.⁶⁸

1 June 16, 2015, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki.

2 Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982/1993); Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2006/1990).

3 Comment by Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir (June 20, 2016).

4 Michael Katz, Nel Noddings, and Kenneth Strike, eds., *Justice and Caring: The Search for Common Ground in Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999).

5 Fabienne Brugère, *L'éthique du "care"* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011), Japanese trans. Tetsu Harayama and Rieko Yamashita (Tokyo: Hakusui-sha, 2014).

6 Paul Standish, "Replacing the Subject of Philosophy" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Japanese Association of the History of Thought of Education, September 15, 2013, Keiko University, Tokyo).

7 Paul Standish, *Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Levinas and the Limits of Language*, trans. Naoko Saito (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2012).

8 Standish, *Beyond the Self*, 111.

9 Ibid., 552–553.

10 Paul Standish, “Social Justice in Translation: Subjectivity, Identity, and Occidentalism,” *Educational Studies in Japan: International Yearbook* 77, no. 6 (2011): 77.

11 Stanley Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 3.

12 Stanley Cavell, *The Senses of Walden* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 130.

13 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 37.

14 Stanley Cavell, *Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 200.

15 Ibid., 221, emphasis added.

16 Ralph W. Emerson, *Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 350.

17 Ludger Viehues-Bailey, *Beyond the Philosopher's Fear: Cavellian Reading of Gender, Origin and Religion in Modern Skepticism* (New Haven: Yale University, 2007).

18 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 38.

19 Ibid., 21.

20 Stanley Cavell, *Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 113.

21 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 20; Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 115.

22 Ibid., 21, 31.

23 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 21

24 Ibid., 23, 36.

25 Ibid., 28.

26 Ibid., 22.

27 Ibid., 38–39.

28 Ibid., 37. This is also thematized in Cavell's *Contesting Tears*.

29 Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 112.

30 Ibid., 70.

31 Stanley Cavell, *Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters of a Register of the Moral Life* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 111.

32 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 162.

33 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 5; Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 528.

34 Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 30, 525.

35 Ibid., 514

36 Henry, D. Thoreau, *Walden in Walden and Resistance to Civil Government*, ed. William Rossi (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 68–69.

37 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 154, 137, 150.

38 Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 16.

39 Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 41.

40 Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 20.

41 Stanley Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), xxxvi, 38; Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 221; Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 132.

- 42 Cavell, *Cities of Words*, 277; Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 39.
- 43 Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 499.
- 44 Ralph W. Emerson, *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 132; Cavell, *Cities of Words*, 31–32.
- 45 Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 213.
- 46 *Stella Dallas*, directed by King Vidor (1937; Hollywood: Samuel Goldwyn Productions), film; Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 36.
- 47 *Gaslight*, directed by George Cukor (1944; Beverly Hills: MGM Studios), film; Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 47–48.
- 48 Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 57.
- 49 Stanley Cavell, *Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 217; Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 36, 35, 38.
- 50 Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 212.
- 51 Emerson, *The Essential Writings*, 309; Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 76.
- 52 Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 211.
- 53 Emerson quoted in Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 133.
- 54 Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 133.
- 55 Thoreau, *Walden*, 216.
- 56 Stanley Cavell, *In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 129.
- 57 Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 100.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 499.
- 59 Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance* (London: Verso, 2013).
- 60 Cavell, *Contesting Tears*, 221.
- 61 Cavell, *Cities of Words*, 277.
- 62 Emerson, *The Essential Writings*, 210.
- 63 Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, 58–59.
- 64 Stanley Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 32.
- 65 Cavell, *Cities of Words*, 124.
- 66 Cavell, *Cities of Words*, 173; quoted in Standish, “Social Justice in Translation,” 78.
- 67 *Ibid.*
- 68 I thank Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir for her comments on an earlier version of this paper.