Why Does Socrates Shame Thrasymachus?

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Despite how revered Socrates is among many educators today, he can seem in the end to be a poor model for them. Part of the reason is that he often shames his interlocutors. More important, this can appear to be his main goal, even his only goal, at least with interlocutors who falsely claim to have wisdom. In stating his mission in life in Plato’s *Apology*, he says that whenever someone lacks wisdom and purports to have it, he will “shame” (ὀνειδίω: 30a1) that person, whoever they are, young or old, citizen or stranger (29e-30a).1 Taking that statement to heart, Plato commentators have produced a flood of essays on shame; and when, for example, they say that Socrates has other means of changing people besides making arguments, shame is almost invariably the device they name.2 Thereby they can only deepen the concern that Socrates is preoccupied with shame, or at least that, besides giving arguments, shaming people is his primary tool.

In this paper, I won’t erase that concern entirely, but I will try to offset it some. I will discuss one of the most salient instances in which Socrates shames someone—namely, his exchange with Thrasymachus in Book 1 of Plato’s *Republic*. Almost unanimously, commentators who have discussed the drama as opposed to the arguments in that exchange have concluded that shaming Thrasymachus is Socrates’ main goal. Some can even leave the impression that it is his only goal.3 I will argue that Socrates’ approach is more complicated than this. On my view, shaming Thrasymachus is just a collateral effect of what Socrates intends, and his strategy is complex enough to involve not only Thrasymachus but also Glaucon and Adeimantus.

I will start by briefly summarizing *Republic* 1 and 2, emphasizing features of them that will be especially significant herein. Next I will name the two main features of the text that factor into my interpretation: the genuineness of Thrasymachus’ anger and his claims about justice, on the one hand, and the extent to which Glaucon and Adeimantus outperform him, on the other hand. I will end by explaining what I think Socrates’ strategy is.
AN OVERVIEW OF REpublic 1 AND 2

Here, first, is an overview of Books 1 and 2 of the Republic. In Book 1, Socrates talks first with Cephalus and then with Polemarchus until Thrasymachus interrupts, acting enraged. Socrates, in his narration, says that Thrasymachus was “hunched up like a wild beast” and “flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces” (336b5-6). In part, Thrasymachus charges that Socrates is “merely striving for victory,” as one commentator puts it. More important, Thrasymachus complains about the fact that Socrates asks questions instead of answering them—in other words, that he only raises objections to other people’s views instead of espousing views of his own and subjecting them to scrutiny (336c5-6). Thrasymachus’ unhappiness about this becomes a major theme in what he goes on to say. For example, when, as usual, Socrates claims to be ignorant, Thrasymachus scoffs and says:

Heracles! Here is that habitual irony of Socrates. I knew it, and I predicted to these fellows that you wouldn’t be willing to answer, that you would be ironic and do anything rather than answer if someone asked you something (337a4-7).

A moment later, Thrasymachus warns that Socrates will resort to his “usual trick” (εἰωθὸς διαπράξηται):

He won’t answer himself, and when someone else has answered he gets hold of the argument and refutes it (337e1-3).

Thrasymachus sounds a similar note shortly afterward:

Here is the wisdom of Socrates; unwilling himself to teach, he goes around learning from others and isn’t even grateful to them (338b1-4).

And for nearly two Stephanus pages (336b-338b), Thrasymachus tries to avoid answering questions and make Socrates answer them, though ultimately Thrasymachus buckles under pressure from Socrates’ other interlocutors.5

Then, remarkably, it is Thrasymachus’ claims that come under review. He makes the following seven, among others:

• Justice is “nothing other than the advantage of the
stronger,” meaning, evidently, that justice is merely a ruse the stronger devise to exploit less powerful people.

- Justice is “someone else’s good, the advantage of the man who is stronger and rules” (343c3-4).
- Justice is a harm (βλάβη) to the one who acts justly (343c4-5), whereas injustice is “profitable and advantageous for oneself” (344c8-9).
- Petty crime, such as robbing temples, kidnapping, and housebreaking, is unjust (344b1-5), and it benefits the person who commits it, as long as no one catches them (348d7-8).
- The tyrant, who goes farther than the petty criminal and carries out “complete injustice,” is the happiest and most blessed (344b5-c3).
- Injustice is a virtue, and justice is a vice (348c-e).
- One has to be a fool to act justly (348c12).

As Socrates scrutinizes these and other claims Thrasymachus makes, Thrasymachus acts cocksure that Socrates will not get the best of him (e.g., 341a-b), but in the end Socrates refutes him so decisively that Thrasymachus blushes and sweats and all but explicitly admits defeat. Along the way, the conversation is fiery, in part since he calls Socrates disgusting (338d), a quibbler (340c), and a snot (343a) and, over and over, accuses him of cheating (338d, 340d, 341a, 341b). Socrates contributes his share, too, partly with biting irony and backhanded praise.

As the exchange ends and Book 2 begins, Glaucon and Adeimantus act dissatisfied with the arguments Socrates has given Thrasymachus; they want better reasons to think justice is choice-worthy. To set the standard for Socrates to reach, Glaucon proposes to “renew Thrasymachus’ argument” (358b8-c1) and, with Adeimantus’ help, tries to articulate a version of it that is less extreme than Thrasymachus’. In response, Socrates treats the challenge seriously and begins his long discussion of the nature and value of justice.
THRASYMACHUS’ ANGER AND CLAIMS ABOUT JUSTICE

There are two main features of *Republic* 1 and 2 that lead to my conclusion about what Socrates’ strategy is with Thrasymachus. To explain them, I need to make some interpretive claims.

One of them should be uncontroversial. It is that Thrasymachus genuinely is angry and believes what he says about justice. One possibility, of course, is that his anger is feigned and that he denounces justice only to thwart Socrates. The chances of this seem slim, though, given a couple of considerations—namely, how irate he acts and, supposing his anger is genuine, how well it fits with what he says about justice. On the one hand, there is not much reason for him to fake being mad, especially as mad as he makes himself out to be. To be sure, it is conceivable that he means to intimidate Socrates so as to throw him off his game, but it is unlikely. Among other reasons, Thrasymachus seems familiar enough with Socrates to realize he is not very flappable.

On the other hand, Thrasymachus, then, most likely believes his claims about justice. The reason, again, is how well they cohere with how infuriated he is; if he believes them, it makes sense that he is so angry, and otherwise it is hard to explain. Consider, first, the nature of his claims. He seems to mean that, because your just action benefits someone other than you, it **cannot** at the same time benefit you. This suggests that, in every interaction between two human beings, one party wins, and the other loses, meaning that the one becomes dominant and, in turn, better off than before, while the other leaves worse off. Human society is a zero-sum game—I win only if you lose—because everyone’s interests conflict necessarily with everyone else’s. Thus, in all interactions with other people, the only reasonable course of action is to try to overpower them and subordinate them so as to profit at their expense. Or, in any case, you should try it if you can get away with it. Like Glaucon and Adeimantus, Thrasymachus does acknowledge that injustice pays only if no one catches you in the act or if you are influential enough to face no opposition. So he implies that, unless you have the political power of a tyrant, the smart move is to cheat and swindle on the sly.

Ostensibly, Thrasymachus thinks this is what Socrates does in his conversations with Cephalus and Polemarchus, and this, plus the fact that they and
the others let him get away with it, is why he is so incensed. He resents Socrates for supposing that, even with Thrasymachus present, he can pass unnoticed and be the dominant one; and Thrasymachus is disgusted not only with Socrates but with Socrates’ friends, too. (At the outset, when Thrasymachus lunges forward furiously, the second line in his statement is addressed to them: “And why do you act like fools, making way for one another?”; 336c1-2.) Thrasymachus believes that philosophical conversation is just a ruse, a means by which someone like Socrates gets to use rhetorical tricks and his interlocutors are supposed to play along. When he seems to them to outmatch their evidence with his, they are to abide by the norms of philosophical conversation and simply concede, instead of using rhetorical force of their own to overpower him. In other words, abiding by those norms is a kind of justice, as Thrasymachus views it. And he is revulsed by the thought that Socrates’ friends have fallen for the scam; in his mind, it is easy to see through it, so they must be ridiculously gullible and too weak to push back. He plans to stop the charade and show them how to put Socrates in his place. Then, Thrasymachus thinks, be can be the dominant one and rule over both Socrates and them. This, anyway, is what Thrasymachus suggests. Because of how well it all hangs together, I conclude that he genuinely has these sentiments. They are the first feature of the Republic that I mean to emphasize.

THRASYMACHUS IN RELATION TO GLAUCON AND ADEIMANTUS

The second feature is that Glaucon and Adeimantus make more trouble for Socrates than Thrasymachus does; at the least, they get him to work harder. One reason, perhaps, is what they contribute philosophically. Arguably, the case they make for injustice is more difficult to refute than Thrasymachus’ arguments.¹⁰

But there is a more basic way in which Glaucon and Adeimantus outpace Thrasymachus, and one that is far more significant by Thrasymachus’ standards. What Thrasymachus hates the most, I suggest, what chaps him more than anything else, is that Socrates presumes to ask questions instead of answering them. Thrasymachus thinks that when you are asking questions rather than answering them, you are in a better position to gain power over your interlocutors. This is why he tries to force Socrates into the role of answering, by mocking and
unmasking his irony. As it turns out, though, Socrates forces *Thrasymachus* into that role. To be sure, it is when Socrates’ friends nag Thrasyphulcus that he finally hands over his definition of justice (338a ff.), so it might seem that it is they rather than Socrates who force him. But Thrasyphulcus is bound to end up answering questions even if they do not intervene. The problem, of course, is that, from the outset, he acts as if he has nothing to learn about justice. Once he takes that posture, whenever he charges that Socrates’ claims of ignorance are phony, Socrates can keep insisting they are sincere and urging Thrasyphulcus to be his teacher, and there is no way for Thrasyphulcus to respond except to withdraw from the discussion or say what he thinks justice is. This is a problem for him since, in order to become dominant, he has to engage.

Yet where Thrasyphulcus fails, Glaucon and Adeimantus succeed: they turn the tables on Socrates so that *he* ends up propounding views while Thrasyphulcus (450a) and the others get to raise objections. More to the point, Glaucon and Adeimantus force Socrates into this position, subtly but effectively, and less with their argument about justice than with the way they frame it. In introducing the argument, Glaucon says he is unpersuaded by what Socrates told Thrasyphulcus, unpersuaded “that it is in every way better to be just than unjust” (357b1-2). Glaucon adds that he does not accept the argument he gives (and evidently he is in earnest about that), but he talks as if he finds it compelling, compelling enough that he is awfully curious what can be said against it (358c-d). If Glaucon and Adeimantus’ argument were not framed thusly, Socrates could pull the same stunt as before: once the argument emerged, he could simply pick holes in it as he did with Thrasyphulcus’ argument and then return to where he was with Polemarchus before Thrasyphulcus first spoke. But Glaucon dangles the perfect bait, irresistible to Socrates. If you suggest to him that you earnestly favor justice but are drawn to injustice, that you don’t know how to reject it, and that his typical cross-examination won’t stop you from turning toward it, he will start propounding views of his own. That is, a maneuver like Glaucon’s is sure to work on Socrates, at least in any situation like the one he is in.

Moreover, Thrasyphulcus should have realized this, and understood that *his* maneuver was bound to fail. He is familiar with the sort of Socratic irony he
complains about, and he believes correctly (albeit for erroneous reasons) that Socrates has a deep investment in promoting justice. So Thrasymachus simply misses the boat, and it is not only Socrates but also Glaucon and Adeimantus who show him up, since they manage to do the very thing Thrasymachus wants most to do and abjectly fails at.

SOCRATES’ STRATEGY

Socrates shames Thrasymachus, of course, and a common view is that this is the main way he tries to change him. Consider, for example, what a couple of commentators have recently said in endorsing this view. On their account, shaming Thrasymachus serves the psychotherapeutic purpose of “exposing [his] problem,” which is “his intellectual instability and lack of self-control,” and “compelling him to seek help” or change his ways. Central to their evidence is the claim that Thrasymachus must be blind to his own true motives—though he thinks he admires injustice, he must be invested in justice instead—because otherwise he would not complain, as he does, that Socrates cheats during his conversation with him; if Thrasymachus really admired injustice, he would applaud cheating.

Though this idea is intriguing, I have reservations about it. I suspect that, as Thrasymachus sees it, calling attention to your interlocutor’s treachery is just part of vying for dominance over them and stopping them from dominating you. To me, it also seems risky to lean much weight on the passage in Plato’s Apology that I quoted above. Commentators often emphasize it in claiming that Socrates means to shame someone, and that is understandable, since, again, Socrates says in that passage that he shames everyone who falsely claims to have wisdom. But there are signs that, in the Apology, he means less to communicate frankly and transparently than to have certain effects on his audience. More importantly, he does not say in that passage that shaming people is his main goal. He allows that it can be just a byproduct or collateral effect of what he intends.

As I have said, I think this is all it is, at least where Thrasymachus is concerned. On my view, Socrates’ intention is just to make it unmistakably clear to Thrasymachus that he has failed to dominate Socrates; and making this clear to Thrasymachus is part of a larger strategy that involves not only him but also
Glaucon and Adeimantus.

It involves the two of them in the following sense: Socrates orchestrates the situation so that Glaucon and Adeimantus force him into the position of answering questions. In saying that they force him, I do not mean that they do so consciously, speaking as they do insincerely and simply to have an effect. Maybe they do, and maybe not. Regardless, Socrates knows them well enough to predict how they will react to his exchange with Thrasymachus; Socrates expects that they will sense the flaws in his arguments, will want a better argument, and will ask for it in roughly the manner they do, thereby making him relent and start propounding views. His capitulation is not staged. In the relevant sense, he has to relent, and he would have to even if it did not serve his purposes with Thrasymachus. But Glaucon and Adeimantus do what Socrates intends, and he intends it, at least in part, for Thrasymachus’ benefit.

There are two ways it is supposed to help Thrasymachus, I propose. First, it is supposed to make him think twice about Socrates’ friends and, in turn, about the value of inquiry. At the outset, Thrasymachus is sure that they take part in inquiry and let Socrates trample them just because they are chumps and are weak: they know no better and are unable to manipulate him instead, as Thrasymachus can. Seeing Glaucon and Adeimantus’ performance is liable to give Thrasymachus pause, not only since they succeed at controlling Socrates but also because they succeed where Thrasymachus fails. Manipulating people is supposed to be Thrasymachus’ forte, yet Glaucon and Adeimantus do better at it than he does, and it is not even their goal at the moment, or at least their ultimate one. So an obvious question for Thrasymachus to ask is why, then, they devote themselves not to manipulation but to inquiry. What about the value of inquiry has he overlooked?

Second, another obvious question is whether he is all that good at manipulating people. What Glaucon and Adeimantus do with Socrates is effective, but it is not particularly inventive. As I suggested, Thrasymachus should have thought of it himself. So although Glaucon and Adeimantus outshine him, the natural conclusion is that this is not because they show exceptional skill but because he shows the opposite. And the more he wonders whether he is inept at power games, the less likely he is to invest in them and keep thinking they are
the means to happiness. Both as children and adults, we in agonistic societies prefer to play the games we are good at, all things being equal, and we tend to favor the views that favor us, the views that cast us in the best light. No elitist thinks they belong among the plebes, and no social Darwinist believes they are one of the weak. Accordingly, it will be good if Thrasymachus contrasts himself with Glaucon and Adeimantus; it will help distance him from his bleak views about human life and, in turn, narrow the gulf between him and virtue.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I have proposed that Thrasymachus’ anger is genuine, that he earnestly believes the claims he makes about justice, and that Socrates responds accordingly. He has Glaucon and Adeimantus do the very thing that Thrasymachus wants most to do and fails to do—namely, force Socrates into the position of answering questions—since Socrates’ hope is that seeing Glaucon and Adeimantus outpace Thrasymachus will prompt Thrasymachus to reconsider the value of inquiry and his focus on dominating other people. Since Socrates means for Glaucon and Adeimantus to surpass Thrasymachus, Socrates makes sure it is unmistakably clear to Thrasymachus that he has failed to dominate Socrates, and in the process Socrates shames him. But shaming him is not Socrates’ main goal. Rather, it is only a collateral effect. This, I hope, will offset the concern that Socrates is preoccupied with shame.

I will add that, if Socrates employs the strategy I have just imagined, I think he responds to Thrasymachus as well as he could. He does shame him, and that can seem problematic even on purely moral grounds. But there is little else for Socrates to do, given the aggressive way Thrasymachus begins the conversation. To be sure, to avoid an altercation, Socrates could lie; for example, he could say he agrees with Thrasymachus about what justice is or, at least, that he has no comeback to him. Lying to Thrasymachus, though, might be no morally better than resisting him, and once Socrates resists, the chances are that Thrasymachus will be shamed. Admittedly, Socrates could approach his task more gently than he does. For example, instead of cross-examining Thrasymachus and cornering him, Socrates could simply state reasons for disagreeing with him, such as the reasons Socrates names in Republic 2-10. This might keep Thrasymachus from
looking quite as bad as he comes to look. But he would look bad, regardless, unless he managed to refute the reasons Socrates gave. Because of how much Thrasymachus beats his chest at the outset of the exchange, he will lose face, no matter what, unless he ends up dominating Socrates. So Socrates might as well respond to him in a way that can really help him (and in a way that can also help the others who are present for the conversation). And that is what Socrates does. He, of course, is unlikely to make immediate improvement with Thrasymachus; once the exchange is over, Thrasymachus will be prone to pout and sulk for awhile, as he does in Republic 2-10. But Socrates leads him as far as one could hope. By creating room for doubt in him, he brings him a step closer to inquiry and virtue, even if there is still an exceedingly long way to go.

1 Herein all references to Plato’s dialogues are to the Greek text in Burnet’s and Slings’ editions in the Oxford Classical Texts series, and all translations of the Republic are based on the ones in Allan Bloom, The “Republic” of Plato, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1968).


4 Ruby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge:

5 Stephanus pages are the pages in the 1578 edition of Plato’s works edited by Henri Estienne, whose Latinized name is Stephanus. The pages in his edition were numbered with Arabic numerals, just as book pages are numbered today, and the two columns on each page (one column of Greek and the other of Latin translation) were each divided into five sections labeled “a” through “e.” Most modern editions of Plato’s writings include pagination in the margins that shows where Stephanus pages and sections begin and end, and scholars generally use that pagination in citing Plato.

6 Thrasymachus uses basically the same phrase, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, at 338c3, 339a3-4, 341a3-4, and 344c7-8.

7 I mean not that Socrates refutes Thrasymachus’ claims about justice but that he refutes Thrasymachus’ claim to know what justice is.

8 Here and in the next three lines I borrow especially from Ralph Wedgwood, “The Coherence of Thrasymachus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 (2017): 33-63. Scholars have read Thrasymachus’ claims in a wide variety of ways; some have even said that the claims together form an incoherent whole. Wedgwood cites earlier work and responds to it. For a summary that reaches farther back, see T. D. J. Chappell, “The Virtues of Thrasymachus,” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 1-17, 2.

9 See, e.g., Cinzia Arruzza, A Wolf in the City: Tyranny and the Tyrant in Plato’s “Republic” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 104, 105; Roslyn Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s “Republic,” ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 90-115, 98; Robert Heinaman, “Plato’s Division of Goods in the Republic,” Phronesis 47, no. 4 (2002): 309-95, 322-3n.28: “Thrasymachus . . . [does] point out the evil consequences of ordinary injustice (344b), i.e. injustice that is not able to avoid punishment and the opprobrium of others. Only injustice done in secret (as in the extreme case of Gyges’ ring) or on a large scale (as in the case of a tyrant) can avoid these conse-
quences (344a-c, 345a; cf. 360e-361b, 365c-d, 367b-c). So although Thrasy- 
machus says that injustice is profitable and justice is not profitable (348c), his 
position is that it is only large scale or secret injustice that is profitable (344c, 
348b, d; cf. 345a).

10 For the claim that Glaucon and Adeimantus are harder to refute, see Ter- 
be sure, Myles Burnyeat is right to suggest that, since Glaucon and Adeiman-
tus don’t contend that injustice is a virtue, their argument is, in one respect, 
easier to refute; see Burnyeat’s “Justice Writ Large and Small in Republic 4,” 
in *Politieia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*, eds. Verity Harte and Melissa Lane 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 212-30, 212-3. It may be 
harder on the whole, though. Take, e.g., the argument Socrates makes (349b1- 
350c11) right before Thrasymachus blushes and sweats. As one commentator 
has recently pointed out, that argument is forceful against Thrasy-machus 
since he claims (e.g., 344a1-2) that anyone who truly practices the art of 
ruling wants to outdo (πλεονεκτεῖν) not just some people but everyone; see 
Tamer Nawar, “Thrasy machus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 
no such claim, and as a result they are invulnerable to arguments like that 
one.

11 At heart, perhaps, their argument is the same as Thrasy-machus’, as C. D. 
C. Reeve argues in “Glaucon’s Challenge and Thrasmacheanism,” *Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 34 (2008): 69-103, 84-6, against scholars such as 
Bernard Williams, “Plato’s Construction of Intrinsic Goodness,” in Bernard 
also that Socrates is ready to leave at the start of Book 2, and he later tells 
Glaucon and Adeimantus: “I thought I showed in what I said to Thrasy- 
machus that justice is better than injustice” (368b5-6). Weiss, “Wise Guys and 
Smart Alecks,” 90, is right that “the only reason Socrates feels he must stay is 
because, as he observes, ‘you did not accept it from me’ [b6-7].”

12 Hoesly and Smith, “Thrasy machus,” 192.
13 Note, e.g., a deceptive move Socrates makes in his first speech to the jury. Shortly after reporting that the god claimed no one was wiser than he is (21a7), he says he asked himself: “What does he mean by saying that I am the wisest?” (21b5-6).

14 There are similar points to make about other passages in Plato’s dialogues (e.g., Gorgias 525b1-c1) where Socrates discusses shame, punishment, or the like.