The term ‘education’ has become omnipresent but also a vague one; we use it for what happens to children at home, at school, at the community center, and other places. We sometimes also use ‘education’ for what happens to adults, both in and outside of the context of schooling. But more than losing coherence, ‘education’ unfortunately starts to fade as other terms and their accompanied discourses surface and overshadow it. The purpose of this essay is to review and briefly analyze these discourses, as well as, in more length, a serious call to completely get rid of ‘education.’ Together, these phenomena threaten the vitality of education. Instead of an important and respected notion that signifies depth, richness, and complexity, as well as dilemmas and paradoxes, it increasingly becomes diminished, shallow and empty.

POPULIST CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION

Following what Bialystok termed the ‘populist’ conception of philosophy,¹ I see the populist conception of education as a simplistic or one-dimensional usage of the term ‘education,’ while ignoring its deep and complex facets. It is usually accompanied with a sense of acquiring something that is considered valuable. Similar to the populist conception of philosophy, the populist conception of education exists on a continuum. In the colloquial usage, ‘education’ just refers to knowledge, as in phrases such as “educate yourself.” In a more formal usage, but one that reveals an instrumental attitude to education, it signifies credentials, in particular degrees, such as the phrase “college education,” sayings such as “I’m going to get an education and a decent job,” and the title “Education” in a resume or curriculum vitae.²

Instrumental sentiment is evident also within the professional realm
of education itself, when education is a general term for having a job—in contrast to, say, a career—particularly teaching, especially in “teacher education.” Such a low appreciation to education and an attitude to education mainly as a means is clear, for example, in the common practice to earn a teaching certificate as a ‘backup,’ just in case one does not manage to secure a ‘better’ professional or academic position. It suggests that (almost) everyone can teach. In a less obvious manner, the job-related sense of education is revealed in the English-speaking world by associating the academic study of education particularly to teacher education, without a broader consideration of education as “a human event of communication, meaning making and interpretation.”

LEARNIFICATION

A major indication of the demise of education is what Biesta terms ‘learnification,’ the focus on ‘learners’ and the ‘language of learning’ that governs educational discourse. Biesta criticized the “tendency to replace a language of education with a language that only talks about education in terms of learning,” since “language of learning makes it particularly difficult to grapple with questions of purpose—and also with questions of content and relationships.” Biesta explained that one of the reasons for the new language of learning is “the erosion of the welfare state and the subsequent rise of neoliberal policies in which individuals are positioned as responsible for their own (lifelong) learning.” He points to two problematic aspects of the new language of learning that indicate how learning is different from education. First, learning is basically an individualistic concept. It refers to what people, as individuals, do—even if it is couched in such notions as collaborative or cooperative learning. This stands in stark contrast to the concept of ‘education’ that always implies a relationship. Secondly, unlike the normative character of education, learning “is basically a process term. It denotes processes and activities but is open—if not empty—with regard to content and direction.” Thus, the notion of learning (and learners) blurs the social aspect in education as well as the normative aspect of education.
Learnification is evident in multiple areas, and some anecdotal examples I have encountered might give a better sense of how deep this phenomenon is. Thus, it is common to see the label ‘Early learner’ on babies’ books; The Ontario’s Ministry of Education kindergarten curriculum states that the goal of the Kindergarten program is “[…] to establish a strong foundation for learning … [that sets] children on a path of lifelong learning and nurture competencies that they will need to thrive in the world of today and tomorrow;”\textsuperscript{10} a central multi-purpose building at Thompson Rivers University is called ‘The Brown Family House of Learning;’ and Wisconsin’s state agency that advances public education is called ‘The Department of Public Instruction’ – the word ‘education’ is not even used. But perhaps the most prominent example for learnification is the rise of distance learning following Covid-19. It is not just that ‘learning’ is now emphasized and is used to characterize what is happening to students and between teachers and students through online and other alternative means; the major problem is even not that distance learning, in any age including higher education, does not work well.\textsuperscript{11} While fundamental critical thinking about the goals of education has never earned the attention of educational practitioners, the major problem with distance learning is that now this discourse is pushed aside or completely ignored; the discourse is almost completely governed by notions of availability (who has computers, internet) and quality (bandwidth) of technology and meeting content-related objectives.

CURRICULUM

From its (quite recent) inception, curriculum studies engaged with foundational questions about education, and curriculum theorists weighted on how these questions are intertwined with curricular matters.\textsuperscript{12} But beyond this, another demonstration for the demise of education is the prevalence—not to say dominance and tyranny—of the structured curriculum as a major guidance for teaching. The structured curriculum of subject matters is developed from bodies of knowledge of particular disciplines. The curriculum, as a formal policy document that imposes or at least guides what to teach (in terms of courses and course content), reflects political struggles over ideol-
ologies, values, and goals of education. In fact, the curriculum is the site for political struggle over education. As such, the curriculum, alongside teachers’ commitment to follow it, is currently the major directive for content in schools (as such, it is also the main vehicle for conveying beliefs about being human). This is especially true in light of neoliberal attacks on education and the attempts to design teacher proof curricula.

The pedagogical emphasis (method courses that focus on how to teach) alongside the dwindling of foundational thinking in general and foundations courses in particular (such as philosophy of education) in teacher education programs is another sign for the dominance of the curriculum. Another telling (although anecdotal) example is this statement on Western University’s Curriculum Studies and Studies in Applied Linguistics webpage: “Curriculum studies is an established, but not uniform, discipline that has been identified as the first (and perhaps only) discipline to be birthed from education itself.”

But the centrality of the curriculum is also evident in its identification with or being synonym to ‘education’ in general, for example when a curriculum course overlaps with general foundational educational courses or replaces them altogether. Such convergence of curriculum with education is demonstrated in curriculum textbooks. Thus, one reader states:

WHAT DO SCHOOLS TEACH, WHAT SHOULD THEY TEACH, and who should decide? Is the primary aim of education to instill basic skills or foster critical thinking? Should education aim to mold future citizens, transmit national values, engender personal development, or inspire academic achievement? Must education have an aim? And what beliefs, values, or attitudes are learned from the way classrooms are?... These are some of the perennial questions around which curriculum scholars have organized theory, research, teaching, and program evaluation.

This identification of curriculum with education, together with the political nature of the curriculum, suggests that the curriculum is a means for
and a signature of instrumentalization of education. As a result, the curriculum is also an obstacle for any non-instrumental perception of education, since it precludes (or at least significantly hinders) educational practitioners, researchers, and theorists to shape schooling according to what they consider as educational values and goals.

**REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY**

The dominance of learning and curriculum over education as the guiding notions and practices in schools (but also outside schools) is demonstrated in the erosion of notions and ideals that are traditionally associated with education. This is perhaps most evident with regard to the ideal of autonomy. Throughout history, autonomy has been a hallmark of education. Autonomy is probably one of the most – if not the most – mentioned goal of education: educating individuals for autonomy, autonomy for students, and autonomy for teachers in schools are frequently discussed. Winch defines autonomy as “the ability of individuals to choose and follow their own conception of a life that they deem to be suitable for themselves,” and Schouten cites Gutman that autonomy involves “living one’s life according to one’s own best lights because one judges this a good way to live.” Ryan and Powelson define autonomy in a psychological-motivational sense as “self-rule,” i.e., regulating one’s own behavior and experience and governing the initiation and direction of action.” As Hayden and Harman note, “[w]hile by no means an exhaustive list, these examples, like most, do not conflict with the basic understanding that autonomy means self-governance, independence, and freedom, or even the power to determine what is valuable and worth incorporating into one’s formation.”

But in today’s schools, none of these meanings of autonomy is the sense of autonomy demonstrated by students or even the one significantly advocated for or encouraged by teachers. As most seasoned teachers know (and probably also every parent with school-aged children), what is left from the aforementioned characterizations of autonomy is a pale and shallow notion of independence in the form of self-doing; “I know how to do it” or “I did it all by myself, without anyone helping me” is the prevalent version of
autonomy dominating schools (and also homes). This aligns with the rooted notion of scaffolding and the descriptive approach for (or culture of) teaching where teachers first explain and illustrate to students a piece of knowledge or skill and eventually expect the students to reperform without any assistance. This educational reduction of the notion of autonomy does not happen in a vacuum, of course; it occurs within a culture of ‘do it yourself’ and i-devices that empowers individuals to handle the world ‘by themselves,’ that is, with the use of available means touted by neo-liberal capitalism but (allegedly) no consultation with other humans, a culture that nurtures a false sense of independence and, indeed, autonomy. Of course, such autonomy is empty from any serious self-governance or freedom, not to mention self-determination of what is valuable and worth incorporating into one’s formation.

DISGUISE OF EDUCATION

It is tempting to think that those four discourses – the populist, learnification, curriculum, and the diminished version of autonomy – attempt to take over education, to replace a discourse and logic of education with some alternative discourses and logics. Learnification, for example, as Biesta characterizes it, implies a language of learning as an alternative to a language of education. However, I argue that these (and other) discourses, not just, and even not mainly, offer themselves as alternatives, but rather, to a significant degree, disguise themselves as education. That is, they do not necessarily seek to eradicate the notion of ‘education’ all together but wish to make modifications in what is considered education; of course, these modifications leave ‘education’ a reduced, diminished, and even empty notion, but it is still, arguably, ‘education.’ The logic behind this move – creating a pseudo-education instead of just getting rid of it – stems from the acknowledgment that ‘education,’ as an intellectual formative idea, still carries an immense historical, cultural, and social value that grants it respect, admiration, and even awe. So, rather than removing ‘education’ from the formative developmental sphere, these discourses prefer to exploit the reputation of education for their own interests by, at least to some extent, pretending to be
education. Again, this posturing produces a shallow version of education, but it is enough for these discourses in order to present themselves as legitimate theoretical and practical frameworks. What they actually offer, though, is a completely different set of intellectual and ethical resources and means than the genuine, traditional education that has been discussed and developed over millennia.

GIVING UP OF EDUCATION

The above demonstrations of exchanging ‘education’ with something else suggest the giving up of education as the central notion of forming the individual in schools. However, in critical educational literature, to explicitly argue against education is very rare; ‘education’ still enjoys some sanctity and as such is shielded from direct and overt attack. But not all critical voices in education are ready to keep the notion ‘education.’ One alternative is willing – and indeed calling – to entirely delete ‘education.’ Unlike the pseudo-education versions, this critique does not try to pretend to be education while acting differently; rather, it sees a false or deceptive worth in education and therefore gives it up, and without much regret. This voice is of S. Yizhar, an Israeli renowned and award-winning author who also served in the Israeli parliament from 1949 to 1955, and, during the 1980s and 1990s, was a professor of education at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Yizhar argues that the time has come to get rid of ‘education,’ a catching and tempting concept that misleads many people into the illusion that they have a real endeavor in their disposal, but in reality is nothing but a wish, superstition, even malicious abuse. As such, and unlike the pretentious attempts of the pseudo-education discourses, Yizhar seeks to present (what he considers) the honest view that speaks the harsh truth about education. While much of Yizhar’s critique is not new and echoes ideas in the ‘mainstream’ scholarship, his conclusion is radical.

In his book *Farewell to Education*, Izhar admits that a claim “against education” sounds crazy, as presumably (and sarcastically) “what else left in the world to believe in if not education” and as education is “the most beautiful human effort to achieve always more from all ‘mores’ in the world,”
including meaning to life, and as “what else there is in the world more this blessed mixture: children, ideals, future – and happiness”?\textsuperscript{28} He is well aware of the conception that education is a “beautiful dream,” “to take and change this person and its world – for good. To take young human beings and shape their personalities – for good; to take young people and to lead them towards any good goal – to lead and also to reach.” He is also aware of the perception that “who else but education knows this person, on the one hand, and society’s goals, on the other – and knows to take in one hand the young and in the other hand the goals, and to bring them together for lovely fostering-walk?”\textsuperscript{29}

However, Izhar quickly questions “whether all this is actually an empty thing? Or perhaps just a naive dream? And maybe self-deception? Or, perhaps, even cynicism, God forbid?”\textsuperscript{30} Against the dream he cites typical critiques such as “who is the one who set the goals for education” and “what really the educator knows, what know his dispatchers, on the future? What do they know about this child today, and what do they know about him how he will be in twenty years?”\textsuperscript{31} He also suggests critiques regarding the hidden curriculum, the fixed and bureaucratic nature of the education system, educationalization of social problems,\textsuperscript{32} and evidence-based educational research, although not in these terms.

To stress the fantasy about education, Izhar likens education to the unicorn, both never seen:

…described to its details, and detailed details, known to everyone and everyone knows it, be in it and go back to it, write about it and read about it and hear about it and tested about it and learn and teach, and it has an honorable and taken for granted place in consciousness, and in institutions, and in universities, and in the distinguished encyclopedias, and in the distinguished dictionaries, and also in the government’s offices and its institutions and in the state’s signs, and where not. In short, education lives and exists, here and everywhere, and it endures, and it is a fact. But, who ever seen it?\textsuperscript{33}
Izhar launches a heavy attack against education and traditional theorizing of education. He contends that such theory is over utopian, saying that "Whatever the philosophy of education is, and whatever its selected values are – always they will be too tall statements to realize. And there is no person who intends to realize them: they are but to sound wonderful." He characterizes education as "a kind of tyranny," "propaganda," "a drawing-magnet to empty words" such that "you don’t have a human field fuller empty and pompous words more than education," aiming for goals such as ‘education to values,’ ‘moral education,’ ‘education for democracy,’ and ‘humanistic education.’ Thus, “education is full of sacred cows.” Nurturing, or seeding by education, is uncertain such that it is like “seeding on a windy day on a sandy ground: a bit sowed, a bit blows in the wind, some who knows, and even that which was sowed – who knows.” Moreover, “education that knows and announces in advance what will be its outcomes – is not education anymore.” Therefore, “everyone who says ‘education’, either is not sensitive to what he says, or already begins to lie and mislead. Knowingly and unknowingly.”

Izhar critiques what he sees as a one-way communication in education where “education is done only according to one volition, the volition of the educator.” He examines an accepted definition of education: “Sum of the processes by which society seeks to transfer the power accumulated in its disposal and its goals to the next generation, for securing its continual existence and its growth.” However, Izhar questions the existence of ‘society’ and its volition, as well as the way it decides about education. Instead of this common society-bound perception of education, he seeks to turn the tables and begins with the child; he calls for an equal adult-child dialogue that involves a compromise. Izhar claims that most dialogues in education are not as such but rather a show, a façade. Thus, education is similar to “transferring governance from the aging ruler to the young ruler… handover of power” not “continuance of power.”

Instead of ‘education,’ Izhar urges us to use ‘instruction’ (or ‘teaching’) and ‘learning.’ While he is aware of the possibility of shallow teaching
and learning, he argues that instruction is “the one, solid, and real core of all education business” and explains the difference between instruction and education:\(^{48}\)

> When you instruct – you sell a tool with a user manual. When you educate – you try (vainly) to penetrate the other’s soul and pretend to bound for him his soul for the rest of his life… instruction does not go to and does not pretend to do but things that people know to do and can do. And among them… and above all, instruction does not bind, and does not try to penetrate without permission.\(^{49}\)

But Izhar is well aware of the different prestige each word possesses. In a claim that resembles the one above regarding pseudo-education he says that “people treat instruction as a lower-level act comparing education, that every and each instructor seeks to be called: educator, no less.”\(^{50}\) As a suggestion that recalls Wisconsin’s Department, he proposes: “Try to alter the names of all institutions, organizations and methods – and instead the empty magic word ‘education,’ why won’t them settle with the modest and simplest and truest and most real word and say: instruction, in the way that instead of ‘Ministry of education and culture’\(^{51}\)– would say… ‘Ministry of instruction and knowledge’… and won’t carry the name of education for vein?” Izhar has no illusions, though: “Never. Such change will be perceived as degradation, teasing, and blasphemy.”\(^{52}\)

Izhar’s view is not immune to criticism, of course; he was critiqued, for example, that he throws out the baby with the bath water; in order to avoid problems with values in education, he prefers a simplistic solution of just completely eliminating education.\(^{53}\) However, for our discussion here, I suggest not to dismiss his critique but to take it seriously, not in order to advance a removal of ‘education’ but to stress the worry that he does it not because of instrumental demands from education or attempts to exploit education, but rather because he was part of the educational academic world and ceased to believe (or perhaps never had a strong belief) in the foundational formative and transformative power of schooling. While Izhar’s perception
of instruction and learning is a more humanistic version of the student-centered approach than the one manifested by neoliberal-oriented learnification, for example, my concern is that such abandonment of ‘education’ as a lofty formative notion with social and ethical aspirations, as expressed throughout the history of (institutional) education, trickles into the practice (and possibly also theory) of education and actually, inadvertently or not, reifies the instrumental approach to education. It is quite possible that such abandonment of ‘education’ is a major root cause for exchanging education with the pseudo-education discourses of learnification and curriculum.

While addressing this concern deserves separate attention, I suggest that a key step in saving education from vanishing – if we care about it and what it represents – is closer and more effective engagement of education professionals, especially teachers (and teacher students), with views on and programs for schooling offered in educational theory. This requires not only changes in teacher education and professional development programs, but probably also in the way we – educational theorists – offer and ‘serve’ our ideas. Otherwise, ‘education’ will thrive only in (scholarly) literature.


2 The populist conception of education is demonstrated in different degrees and takes different forms in different languages, following different terms for ‘education’.

3 The low enrollment requirements for teacher education programs allow and fuel this practice. This also relates to universities considering education programs, and especially teacher education, cash cows for the institution.


6 Biesta, *Good education in an age of measurement*, 5.

7 Biesta, *Good education in an age of measurement*, 18.

8 Biesta, 18.

9 Biesta, 18.


11 An Israeli news report stated that distance (or ‘from far’) learning is far from being learning (it sounds better in Hebrew).

12 It is beyond the scope of this essay to show how the work of theorists such as Pinar, Bobbitt, and Tyler engage with foundational thinking about education. See also: Stefan Hopmann, “The curriculum as a standard of public education,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 18, no. 1-2 (1999): 89-105.


15 This does not mean to dismiss or underestimate the hidden curriculum, as well as the fact that teachers and students mediate, reinterpret, and sometimes reject the curriculum.


18 [https://www.edu.uwo.ca/faculty-profiles/cssal.html](https://www.edu.uwo.ca/faculty-profiles/cssal.html).


25 On Ranciere’s critique of the logic of explanation, Biesta notes: “explanation – and particularly the attempt to explain what’s really going on in anoth-
er person’s head or life – is not the way of emancipation.” Gert Biesta, *The Rediscovery of Teaching* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017), 77.

26 S. Yizhar is the pen name of Yizhar Smilansky (1916-2006). I will follow the common practice and refer to him as ‘Yizhar.’

27 Yizhar Smilansky, *Farewell to Education* (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1988), 9. (in Hebrew). All translations are mine.

28 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 10.

29 This optimist view of education aligns, of course, with the traditional humanistic view of education.

30 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 10.

31 Smilansky, 10.


33 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 14.

34 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 18.

35 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 22.

36 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 47.

37 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 36.

38 cf. Hayden and Harman’s analysis that education “either remains whole or is annihilated by operationalization applied to it.” Hayden & Harman, “Schooling’s Relative Non-Autonomy.” Izhar is aware of and critically examines available theories of education, including Dewey’s.

39 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 41.

40 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 43.

41 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 59. For a similar critique see: Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph Dunne, “Alasdair MacIntyre on education: in dialogue

42 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 45.

43 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 62.

44 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*. Izhar adopts a definition from Cyclopaedia of Education, 1911.

45 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 71.

46 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 74.

47 Unlike English that has two different verbs for the teaching-learning sides, in Hebrew it is sometimes common to use the same root – but with a different grammatic form – for the teacher’s (דמלל) and the student’s (דמלל) experience. I will use instruct and teaching (depending on the context) for the teacher’s side and learning for the student’s side. Izhar’s call is not only semantic, of course; his appeal reflects his critique on schooling in general.

48 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 55.

49 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 46.

50 Smilansky, 46.

51 The name of the Ministry in Israel.

52 Smilansky, *Farewell to Education*, 46.